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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to the Utah
Constitution Article VIII, Section 3, and Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee takes specific exception to-Appellant's form of issues presented for review on
this appeal as follows:
Issue no. 3. The trial court did not determine as a matter of law that Appellant was not
entitled to a credit against his obligations under the Decree of Divorce for the benefits actually
received by Appellee pursuant to the Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties, and
Appellant has produced no such finding or order to that effect.
Issue no. 4. The trial court in fact directed Appellant to submit evidence in the form of
affidavits and granted Appellant an evidentiary hearing on all payments, in any form, made by
Appellant to Appellee toward his obligations under the Divorce Decree and Appellant has
produced no such finding or order to the contrary.
Issue no. 7. The issue of procedure to seek award of attorney's fees was not preserved
for appeal because it was not objected to in Appellant's Objection to the Order.
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DETERMINATTVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules of the State of Utah read verbatim as follows:
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken
from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all finai orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided
by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. . . .

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. . . .
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2)
under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59
to alter or amend the judgment; (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. . . .

Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-10.6.
Payment under child support order — Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child support
order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district court,
except as provided in Subsection (2).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the Case.
This case deals with (i) Appellee's collection actions against Appellant for amounts due
and owing under the Decree of Divorce dated May 7, 1986, and the arrearage amounts reduced
to judgment thereafter; (ii) the validity of the so-called Settlement Agreement which Appellant
asserts superseded and nullified the Decree of Divorce; and (iii) whether or not the fact finder,
in this case Judge Timothy R. Hanson, committed clear error in his findings of fact.

b. Course of Proceedings.
1. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 1.
2. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 2.
3. Appellee disputes Appellant's paragraph 3 to the extent it seeks to interpret the
Settlement Agreement.
4. Appellee disputes Appellant's paragraph 4 in that it makes a bold statement of fact
about Appellant having "transferred eighty vending machines" that is not only untrue, but is not
supported by the portion of the record to which Appellant directs the Court's attention, "R. 148152," or by any other portion of the record. Paragraph 4 further asserts that Appellant was
precluded from presenting evidence of his performance under the Settlement Agreement, but
such is also untrue. To support this assertion Appellant cites to "R. 1178-79," which, in fact,
is the Trial Court's directive that the parties brief the Trial Court on the legal issues involved
in the validity and enforceability of the Settlement Agreement, and to include "affidavits" to
present evidence to the Court and to create a factual record on which to determine the existence
or lack of payment, consideration, and any other factual issue to be raised in connection with
the Settlement Agreement. R. 1177-80. In response to the Trial Court's directive Appellant
submitted his Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated December 11, 1992,
containing 10 pages of argument and 44 pages of evidence. R. 94-152 Although not properly
3

admitted in affidavit form, such evidence included information concerning Appellant's alleged
vending machine business and alleged compensation to Appellee thereunder. R. 146-152.
Appellant desired to preempt and supersede the Decree of Divorce by the mere existence
of the Settlement Agreement. R. 49-50. The Trial Court correctly found that the Settlement
Agreement was invalid for that purpose, but allowed Appellant to present any and all evidence
of payment, in any form, in his legal brief of December 11, 1992, and at the evidentiary
hearings ordered on November 23, 1992. R. 1177-80. Appellant additionally presented much
testimony concerning payment of his obligations at the hearings, which testimony was
unsupported by documentary evidence and found to be unpersuasive by the Trial Court, but
failed to present any evidence of payment by any form of "in kind" transfers of personal
property, including vending machines.
5. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 5.
6. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 6.
7. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 7, but refers the Court to paragraph
4, supra, wherein Appellee cites the Trial Court's directive that both parties create an
evidentiary record through affidavits and other evidence for the purpose of determining whether
or not the Settlement Agreement was lawful or against public policy, and whether or not any
consideration was received from Appellant pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. Other than
the evidence he attached to the Memorandum dated December 11, 1992, Appellant failed to
present any such evidence or create any such record.
8. Appellee disputes Appellant's paragraph 8 in that it states that "no such judgment
existed." The subject writ was based on the Judgment in the form of the Decree of Divorce,
pursuant to Section 30-3-10.6 Utah Code Annotated, which provides in pertinent part, "Each
payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child support order, as defined by
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it is due: (a) a judgment with the same
attributes and effect of any judgment of a district court. . . ." R. 158.
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9.

Appellee disputes Appellant's paragraph 9 based on the following: (a) at the

November 23, 1992 hearing, the Trial Court ordered that the parties brief the Court on the
issues involved in the Settlement Agreement and the payment and nonpayment of amounts due
under the Divorce Decree and submit affidavits and other evidence of the factual issues involved
(see paragraphs 4 and 7, supra, and R. 86); and (b) Appellant did brief the Trial Court and
attached 44 pages of evidence to such brief (see paragraphs 4 and 7, supra, and R. 94-152).
Appellant's brief and evidence were totally inadequate to overcome his burden under the law,
as clarified by Appellee's Brief (R. 87-93) and Reply Brief (R. 159-178), which briefs included
evidentiary affidavits, including requests and evidence of attorney's fees and costs.
10. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 10.
11. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 11.
12. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 12, but adds that at none of the
hearings requested by Appellant and held through January 1992, including the hearing of January
25, 1992, did Appellant present any further evidence supporting his claims that he had made "in
kind" transfers of personal property to Appellee. R. 317-332.
13. Appellee disputes Appellant's paragraph 13 in that it states that the Trial Court
"refused to hear evidence as to the benefit received by Ms. Broadbent under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement. R. 1187-1188." The only reference to the Settlement Agreement in the
record at pages 1187-1188 is the Trial Court's statement, "I just said we wouldn't re-visit the
issue as to whether the parties had an enforceable stipulation. I've already decided that." This
was in reference to the validity of the Settlement Agreement as to its ability to preempt and
supersede the Decree of Divorce by the its mere existence as had been ruled on in the Trial
Court's Order of January 14, 1992. This was no prohibition on whether or not evidence of
payments made to Appellee by Appellant pursuant to the Settlement Agreement actually
occurred.
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In fact, that was the very purpose for the evidentiary hearing in which the Trial Court
was then engaged-to determine the full extent of payments of any kind that Appellant had made
to Appellee, in any form. Appellant was free to present evidence of such payments, if any he
possessed. Appellee was prepared to present evidence of issues related to payments made in the
form of "vending machines" pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, as evidenced by the exhibit
list. R. 311. Plaintiffs Exhibits nos. 1, 2, 4, and 7 were all prepared to rebut Appellant's
anticipated claims of payments made in the form of vending machines, but were never offered
into evidence because Appellant abandoned that defense and offered no evidence of payments
made with vending machines.
Additionally, the Trial Court ordered the parties to provide closing arguments in writing,
ordering Appellee to address issues of amounts to which she was entitled and ordering Appellant
to "address any credits he believefs] he is entitled to." R. 352.
14. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 14.
15.

Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 15, but notes to the Court

Appellant's lack of objection to the grant of attorney's fees, which Appellant now seeks to raise
in this appeal.
16.

Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 16, but notes to the Court

Appellant's lack of objection to the grant of attorney's fees, which Appellant now seeks to raise
in this appeal. R. 1423-1424.
17. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 17.
18. Appellee does not dispute Appellant's paragraph 18.
19. Appellee does not dispute the existence of Appellant's Notice of Appeal nor the
purported contents thereof as alleged in paragraph 19, but disputes the effect as asserted by
Appellant. The January 1993 Order was not "modified" by the June 1993 Order and Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellee believes that in addition to those facts enumerated by Appellant, the following
facts are important to the Court's understanding of the issues:
1. The Trial Court found that "during the course of the marriage, the [Appellant] has
treated the [Appellee] cruelly, causing her great distress and upset . . . ." R. 17.
2. The amounts that the Trial Court awarded Appellee from the Appellant in the Decree
of Divorce for alimony, child support, and other maintenance of the parties' minor child, were
never paid by Appellant absent the present litigation, and Appellee was forced to shoulder the
entire financial and emotional burden of providing for and raising the child:
[Defendant's response has been unpersuasive, and appears to be calculated
merely to frustrate the attempted collection of any amounts that have long been
due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant.
The defendant has done little, if anything, to comply with the Court's orders
in the original Decree of Divorce. He has made insignificant contributions to the
financial needs or other welfare of the child, and has basically left the total
responsibility for those obligations to the plaintiff. The defendant's efforts to
further frustrate the plaintiffs attempted collection of at least some of the
amounts that she is rightfully entitled appear to the Court to border upon bad
faith, and while the Court does not make such a specific finding, it does award
attorney's fees on the basis that the expenses and fees have been incurred as a
result of the demands of the defendant, and that the defendant has failed to
prevail. The plaintiff is not in a position to pay the attorney's fees that she has
incurred as a result of the defendant's challenge to Garnishments and other
matters, as contained herein, and further considering the conduct of the defendant
throughout these long proceedings since the divorce Decree was originally
entered, and his lack of any meaningful cooperation, the additional attorney's fees
are not only warranted, but in this Court's view mandated. [R. 507-08]
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3. The Settlement Agreement was intended by Appellant to supplant and supersede the
Decree of Divorce: "In exchange for a full release from all past, present or future obligations
relating to child support or alimony, Ross Broadbent hereby agrees [to] provide Helen Schumann
with vending machines under the following terms.M R. 49.
4. Appellee signed the Settlement Agreement in the scant hope of receiving some
financial input from Appellant for the support of the parties' child. R. 88; 239-247. Appellee
received no benefit under the Settlenlent Agreement. R. 232-33.
5. The Settlement Agreement proposed as consideration to give Appellee only that which
she had already been awarded in the Decree of Divorce, and therefore, constituted no new
consideration. R. 233.
6.

Appellant's acts and protracted litigation have been retaliatory and vindictive,

including his Petition to Modify Custody of the parties' minor child, when he lost on these
financial issues below. R. 418-28. The Index to this file is 8 pages long due thereto.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The January 14, 1993 Order is not properly before this Court on appeal because no
Notice of Appeal was timely filed and appeal was not preserved by any subsequent motions filed
by Appellant in the Trial Court.
The so-called Settlement Agreement was raised below as a bar to Appellee's collecting
any amounts due under the Decree of Divorce and was advanced by Appellant as a document
that superseded and supplanted the Decree of Divorce. In fact, the Settlement Agreement was
invalid ab initio in that it was against public policy and constituted no new consideration.
Appellant was not barred from putting on evidence of payments made toward his obligations
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, but chose to exclude certain spurious claims that he had
made in kind payments under the Settlement Agreement. A two day evidentiary hearing was
conducted below in addition to the Trial Court's directive that the parties submit affidavits and
8

other factual evidence of any payments made by Appellant, but Appellant failed to put on any
such evidence of in kind payments.
The Trial Court did not commit clear error in assessing the facts from the totality of the
evidence presented. The Trial Court's determination of amounts owed, credits given, and
interest due were based on the evidence, or lack of contrary evidence, provided by the parties.
The Trial Court properly awarded Appellee her costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and Appellee is entitled to her costs of defending against this appeal, including reasonable
attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
APPEAL OF THE JANUARY 14,1993 ORDER WAS NOT FILED WITHIN
THE TIME PERIOD PROVIDED BY THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE.
The Notice of Appeal declares that Appellant appeals the "Final Order and Judgment"
of January 14, 1993. Appellant failed to properly appeal such Order (no Judgment existed)
pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or to properly preserve
the right to appeal the January 14, 1993 Order pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, the right to appeal that Order has lapsed and is nonexistent, and this appeal to that
extent must be dismissed.
Rule 4(a), U.R.A.P., provides 30 days in which an appeal of right may be taken from
a judgment or order of a trial court. Rule 5 provides 20 days in which to appeal from an
interlocutory order. In the present case, the pertinent Order of the trial court was entered on
January 14, 1993, and the Notice of Appeal was filed no sooner than July 8, 1993. This, of
itself, precludes the Court of Appeals from considering the January 14, 1993 Order. However,
Appellee anticipates two possible arguments for preserving the appeal by Appellant, and
addresses those below.
9

a. The January 25, 1993 motions fail to extend the appeal time.
Appellant filed motions with the trial court within two weeks of the January 14, 1993
Order, requesting the court to revisit its Order in various ways. Rule 4(b), U.R.A.P., provides
as follows:
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2)
under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59
to alter or amend the judgment; (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. . . .
Appellant's motions of January 25, 1993, failed to request reconsideration under Rules
50 or 52, U.R.C.P., eliminating an extension under parts (1) or (2) of Rule 4(b), U.R.A.P. The
only possible basis for extension of time under Rule 4(b) is Appellant's invocation of Rule
59(a)(1) and (7), and Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P. in his January 25, 1993 motions. These portions
of Rule 59 fail to apply, however, because (1) they apply only to a "new trial," and (2) Rule
59(b) requires that such "motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment." Because no trial was had on which the January 14, 1993 Order was
based, and because the January 25, 1993 motions were signed and filed more than 10 days
following the entry of the judgment and served 3 days after that, Appellant is estopped from
invoking the extension provisions of Rule 4(b), U.R.A.P. Because of these same defects, the
Trial Court disregarded the motions.
Furthermore, the January 25, 1993 motions failed to request that the Trial Court amend
or rehear any portion of the January 14, 1993 Order regarding the invalidation of the Settlement
Agreement. See requests (a) through (f), pp. 1 and 2. Although the Trial Court failed to rule
on the January 25, 1993 motions due to their late filing and improper bases, the Trial Court did
allow an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the amount of arrearages and offsets, deciding all
of the issues raised in requests (a) through (f) of the January 25, 1993 motions. Therefore, the
issue of the invalidation of the Settlement Agreement was not preserved for appeal by the filing
10

of the January 25, 1993 motions, even had the motions been filed within the 10 days allowed
under the Rule.

b. The June 28, 1993 Orders and Judgment fail to extend the time to appeal the January
14, 1993 Order.
The Notice of Appeal asserts that the January 14, 1993 Order was "modified by two
additional judgments and orders entered on the 28th day of June, 1993," and further asserts that
the "appeal is taken from the entirety of the judgments and orders." From this language
Appellee infers that Appellant intends to bootstrap the January 14, 1993 Order into an appeal
by merging the January 14, 1993 Order with the Orders and Judgment of June 28, 1993.
As demonstrated in the history provided above, the portion of the January 14, 1993 Order
at issue is the invalidation of the Settlement Agreement, which was a question of law. As also
outlined above, this question of law on the validity of the Settlement Agreement was not
appealed and was never again revisited by the trial court and not at issue in the June 28, 1993
Orders and Judgment. In fact, the June 28, 1993 Orders and Judgment merely settled factual
questions by determining the amount of arrearages and offsets between the parties. No question
of law was addressed in the June 28, 1993 Orders and Judgment.
Therefore, the Court may determine herein whether or not the Trial Court erred in its
factual findings in the June 28, 1993 Orders and Judgment. The Court may not revisit the issues
of law decided by the Trial Court in the January 14, 1993 Order, because they were not
appealed in a timely manner.
Issue II is included below in the event the Court disagrees with Appellee's position in
Point I. Otherwise, the Trial Court's January 14, 1993 Order invalidating the Settlement
Agreement should not even be addressed on this appeal.
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ISSUE n
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE
AS BEING AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND AS LACKING ANY NEW
CONSIDERATION.
a. The Settlement Agreement is against Public Policy.
It is well established law in this state that contracts like the Settlement Agreement are
illegal and invalid, and against public policy. The Utah Supreme Court summed up the Utah
cases in Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981), stating, "The right to support from the
parents belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being bartered away, extinguished,
estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents, Gulley v. Gulley,
Utah, 570 P.2d 127 (1977); Baggs v. Anderson, Utah, 528 P.2d 141 (1974); French v. Johnson,
16 Utah 2nd 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965)."
Appellee had paid nothing toward his child support, alimony, or other obligations under
the Decree of Divorce through the date of offering Appellee the Settlement Agreement, and paid
nothing thereafter until these collection proceedings were initiated. The Settlement Agreement
was offered to Appellee by Appellant for a singular purpose: "In exchange for a full release
from all past, present or future obligations relating to child support or alimony . . . ." R. 49.
This represents precisely the kind of contract that Hills disallows. The controlling language of
Hills was taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Baggs. Therein, as here, the delinquent
father induced the custodial mother into entering into a settlement agreement, excusing him from
the obligation of child support if he were to perform certain duties under the settlement
agreement. The Baggs Court likewise held that such a contract is against public policy, and is,
invalid from its inception.
Therefore, on these grounds alone, the Trial Court was correct in its decision invalidating
the Settlement Agreement as being violative of public policy and the holdings in Baggs and
Hills. The Trial Court's decision negated Appellant's argument that the Trial Court was barred
by the mere existence of the Settlement Agreement from considering any factual issue of whether
12

or not any consideration passed from Appellant to Appellee under the Decree of Divorce. That
was the sole ruling of the Trial Court with respect to the Settlement Agreement.

b. The Settlement Agreement provided no New Consideration.
The Settlement Agreement purported to give Appellee only that to which she was already
entitled under the Decree of Divorce, only in a different form-vending machines, with some
arbitrary value, to be fixed by Appellant. In Baggs, the Supreme Court declared its second
reason for finding that the settlement agreement between the father and mother was invalid ab
initio:
[W]e further observe that there are other obstacles to the invocation of [an
estoppel] doctrine here. A serious one is that we cannot see wherein the
defendant gave any consideration for the claimed agreement that he would not
have to pay any future support money. That is, he neither gave anything of
value, nor suffered any legal detriment for that promise. Under the decree he
was already obligated to make payments of $200 per month. Such an agreement
to do that which one is already required to do does not constitute consideration
for a new promise. [At 143].
This Settlement Agreement is precisely like that in Baggs, only more egregious. Because the
Settlement Agreement purports to give Appellee only that which the Trial Court had already
awarded her, it fails to offer any new consideration, thereby invalidating the Settlement
Agreement.
Again, on these grounds the Trial Court was correct in its decision invalidating the
Settlement Agreement as being violative of public policy and the holdings in Baggs and Hills.

ISSUE in
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT OF HIS OBLIGATIONS.
The Trial Court observed the tactics of Appellant for years as he disputed any obligation
to help in the financial requirements of raising his son. It recognized that the Settlement
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Agreement was just one more ruse to escape his obligations under the Decree of Divorce.
Nevertheless, in determining whether or not the Settlement Agreement was legally valid, the
Trial Court specifically ordered the parties to brief the Trial Court on the legal issues involved,
and to provide factual evidence on which to determine the existence or lack of payment
thereunder, consideration, and any other factual issue to be raised in connection with the
Settlement Agreement, as a basis for its decision on the validity, enforceability, and payments
made pursuant to, the Settlement Agreement. R. 1177-80.
In response to the Trial Court's directive Appellant submitted his Defendant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated December 11, 1992, containing 10 pages of
argument and 44 pages of evidence. R. 94-152 Although not properly admitted in affidavit
form, such evidence included information concerning Appellant's alleged vending machine
business and alleged compensation to Appellee thereunder. R. 146-152.
Based on the evidence (and lack thereof) submitted by the parties and legal briefs of
counsel, the Trial Court correctly found that the Settlement Agreement was invalid for the
purpose of estopping Appellee from presenting evidence of amounts owed under the Decree of
Divorce.
The Trial Court ordered evidentiary hearings allowing Appellant the opportunity to
present any and all evidence of payment, in any form. Appellant presented much testimony
concerning payment of his obligations at the hearings, which testimony was unsupported by
documentary evidence and found to be unpersuasive by the fact finder, the Trial Court. At such
hearings Appellant failed to present any evidence of payment by any form of "in kind" transfers
of personal property, including vending machines. Appellant was not estopped or barred from
presenting evidence of any such in kind payments. He was merely estopped from relitigating
the validity of the Settlement Agreement, as it related to acting as a bar to hearing evidence of
amounts owed under the Divorce Decree. Appellant decided not to present any such evidence
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when he saw on the Exhibit List that Appellee was prepared to expose his "payment in the form
of vending machines" defense as a hoax.
It was Appellant who decided not to present evidence of in kind payments—first by way
of affidavit during the legal briefings ordered by the Trial Court, and second by way of
testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearings.
It is only retrospectively that Appellant decided to continue his pattern of legal
harassment of Appellee by claiming that he had not received a fair hearing, which has been his
drone from the very beginning of these proceedings. In fact, Appellant just wants several bites
at the same apple. Appellant had his opportunity to present his evidence, if any he possessed,
and chose not to present the same, for reasons known only to him and his counsel. He cannot
now, after having made such a decision, claim that he was denied the opportunity.

ISSUE IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
The remaining issues addressed by Appellant are factual issues which were decided by
the Trial Court based on the evidence presented, including the demeanor of the witnesses. The
demeanor of the witnesses was especially important in this case because of Appellant's clear lack
of interest in anything but his own welfare, financial and otherwise, as was amply demonstrated
by him on the witness stand.

a. The Trial Court did not commit clear error in adding interest and costs of collection
to the 1987 judgment.
Again, this issue was not timely appealed, and was not addressed in any rehearing or new
trial motion late-filed and invoked to bootstrap the January 14, 1993 Order into the July 1993
Notice of Appeal.
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Appellant first disagrees with the Trial Court's acceptance of Appellee's calculations of
amounts owed under the 1987 Judgment, When presenting evidence at the hearing of November
23, 1992, and in the subsequent legal briefs ordered by the Trial Court, Appellant failed to
present any contrary evidence of what the correct amount of the 1987 Judgment was. R. 160.
Appellant merely denied that he owed Appellee any amount, or ever would owe her any amount,
based on the existence of the Settlement Agreement. Appellant now seeks a trial de novo and
attempts to present new evidence of what he believes the calculations should be. Appellant is
not entitled to a trial de novo before the Court of Appeals, and is limited to the evidence he
presented to the Trial Court on this matter, which was no evidence. R. 233.

b. The Trial Court did not commit clear error in awarding Appellee her costs and
attorney's fees in the collection of child support.
Again, this issue was not timely appealed, and was not addressed in any rehearing or new
trial motion late-filed and invoked to bootstrap the January 14, 1993 Order into the July 1993
Notice of Appeal.
As Appellant has acceded, a trial court has the power to award attorney fees in domestic
proceedings. Appellant's Brief at 31. Such an award under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-33 is not limited to actions prior to the signing of the Decree of Divorce, and Appellant's
statement to the contrary is without merit. Furthermore, the Trial Court was free to exercise
its discretion under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 in awarding attorney's fees in this
case. Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). The Trial
Court was faced with a father who refused to pay his child support, and whose financial
abilities, when compared with those of the custodial mother, enabled him to outspend her in her
collection efforts. Appellant's efforts to avoid collection by his repeated challenges to the Writs
of Garnishment and demands for hearings, his inducing Appellee into entering into the
Settlement Agreement after having refused to pay his child support and alimony obligations for
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years, and other legal maneuvers, all convinced the Trial Court that attorney's fees were proper
in this case. This was a matter well within the Trial Court's discretion. Adams, at 1197.
As articulated in Adams, Appellant's burden is to "marshall all the supporting evidence
and demonstrate its [legal] insufficiency" to support the Trial Court's finding that attorney's fees
were warranted. Id. Appellant has failed to prove that the Trial Court abused its discretion and
cannot do so, because the facts demonstrate that Appellant's litigation activities were orchestrated
for the purpose of circumventing the Decree of Divorce and due process, not to facilitate them,
as he claims herein.

c. The Trial Court did not commit clear error in awarding Appellee twelve percent
interest.
Appellant argues that the Trial Court should have awarded "contract" prejudgment
interest for amounts due under the Decree of Divorce. Appellant ignores the law as argued
before the Trial Court and decided thereby. R. 1420-23. Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-10.6.
provides in pertinent part: "(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under
any child support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it is
due: (a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district court,
except as provided in Subsection (2)."
The amounts sought in the June 1993 Order and Judgment were all "child or spousal
support under a[] child support order," the Decree of Divorce, and interest was calculated from
the date each such amount became due, at the statutory rate of twelve percent. Any argument
to the contrary is made in bad faith. Granted, interest on the June 1993 Judgment would be
calculated at a lower rate thereafter—but interest is calculated at the rate in effect on the date a
Judgment was entered, not the date on which a Judgment is paid.
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d. The Trial Court did not commit clear error in awarding Appellee various amounts for
reimbursement of costs paid by hen
Appellant engages in whining over amounts awarded by the Trial Court and again seeks
trial de novo in the Utah Court of Appeals on issues properly decided by the Trial Court. Under
the Decree of Divorce Appellee was entitled to reimbursements for the minor child's medical
and dental care costs, lessons and summer school expenses, and reimbursement for medical and
life insurance coverages. A great deal of testimony was provided to the Trial Court, as well as
documentation, all taken together, demonstrating the amounts owed Appellee by Appellant.
Appellant makes blanket statements herein that the Trial Court made its decisions based on
"flimsy evidence." Appellant's Brief, at 31. Appellant goes to the length of attempting to cite
to matters not in the record to convince this Court that the Trial Court was in error. Id., at 27.
Appellee should not be forced to relitigate the hearings held before the Trial Court in this
Brief. The Trial Court properly found that "books, flags, school pictures, flash cards, overdue
book fees, magazine subscriptions, crafts and clothing" were indeed, expenses related to lessons
and summer school. It based its decision on the evidence presented and the demeanor of the
witnesses. These are items that one would normally associate with lessons and summer school,
and Appellant has no basis for asserting otherwise.

Appellant has demonstrated only his

unwillingness to provide such items for his child, but has completely failed to demonstrate that
the Trial Court committed clear error in so denominating such items, which is his burden. If
anything, this Court should gain a feel for the Appellant's tactics in avoiding his responsibilities
to his child by the tenor of these arguments.

e. The Trial Court did not commit clear error in awarding Appellee additional attorney's
fees.
In the January 14, 1993 Order, recognizing Appellee's need for financial resources in
attempting to collect child support, the Trial Court awarded Appellee ongoing costs of collection,
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including a reasonable attorney's fee. R. 234. Contrary to Appellant's representation to this
Court, in the Memorandum Decision of April 28, 1993, the Trial Court addressed the issue:
[Defendant's response has been unpersuasive, and appears to be calculated
merely to frustrate the attempted collection of any amounts that have long been
due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant.
The defendant has done little, if anything, to comply with the Court's orders
in the original Decree of Divorce. He has made insignificant contributions to the
financial needs or other welfare of the child, and has basically left the total
responsibility for those obligations to the plaintiff. The defendant's efforts to
further frustrate the plaintiffs attempted collection of at least some of the
amounts that she is rightfully entitled appear to the Court to border upon bad
faith, and while the Court does not make such a specific finding, it does award
attorney's fees on the basis that the expenses and fees have been incurred as a
result of the demands of the defendant, and that the defendant has failed to
prevail. Tlie plaintiff is not in a position to pay the attorney's fees that she has
incurred as a result of the defendant's challenge to Garnishments and other
matters, as contained herein, andfurther considering the conduct of the defendant
throughout these long proceedings since the divorce Decree was originally
entered, and his lack of any meaningful cooperation, the additional attorney 'sfees
are not only warranted, but in this Court's view mandated. [R. 507-08, emphasis
supplied]
Appellant raises the issue of when evidence of attorney's fees was presented to the Trial
Court. This is an issue not preserved for appeal, never having been raised in the objections to
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of June 1993.l It is, in fact, an attempt

1

Appellant's Objections were limited to the following:
[1] c. Paragraph 12 of plaintiffs proposed Findings should be amended to include the language
found at page 7, paragraph 1 of the Memorandum Decision as follows: "The plaintiff seeks an
award of attorney's fees and costs in an additional amount of $4,145.00 for additional fees and
costs related to the defendant's objections to the amounts contained in the Writs of Garnishment
and demands for evidentiary hearings to recalculate and offer evidence relating to the amount
claimed by the plaintiff." [R. 544-45].

[3] b. Paragraph 28 of the proposed Order should be amended to reflect the statutory language
found at Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration if the court deems that such
award is equitable. [R. 546].
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by new counsel who was not present in any of the hearings or other proceedings before the Trial
Court, to retrospectively attempt to attack the Trial Court's grant of attorney's fees to Appellee.
The proceedings below were ongoing, and at no point until June of 1993 was there any
indication that the continuing challenges to Appellee's collection attempts would cease. The
Trial Court had awarded ongoing attorney's fees,2 and the same were never finally calculable
until entry of the June 1993 Order and Judgment. Affidavits of attorney fees are found
throughout the record together with testimony concerning Appellee's needs in regard to the
award of attorney fees. In Appellee's affidavit dated January 21, 1993, Appellee testifies: "I
have incurred substantial costs and attorneys fees in my efforts to collect the above detailed
amounts, and my attorney will submit an Affidavit of Attorney Fees following the hearing on
this matter." R. 243; see also R. 174.
Appellee did not just seek attorney's fees for the actual evidentiary hearings, which were
continued for months, but for all phases of the proceedings. The Trial Court's grant of ongoing
attorney's fees allowed Appellee to request attorney's fees at any time such amounts had reached
a sufficient level that Appellee felt she should request that the Trial Court reduce them to
judgment. Appellant's actions in these proceedings gave Appellee and the Trial Court every
indication that there would be continuing litigation for many months to come—which indications
have been borne out, through the date of this briefing, and into the future when Appellant's
Petition to Modify Custody is tried. Therefore, evidence of need was offered before and during
the hearings, but the issue of the amounts and reasonableness was reserved until those amounts
could be fully calculated. The evidentiary hearings were held to decide the single issue of
amounts owed pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and what payments or credits should be
allowed to Appellant. Any other issue was strictly prohibited. Therefore, Appellee properly

Paragraph 3 of the January 1993 Order provides: "Plaintiff may augment the amounts of such outstanding
Judgments by her costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ." R. 234. The term "outstanding
Judgments" refers to all of the amounts that were sought and awarded below.
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defendant, having heard the sworn testimony of the plaintiff, and
good cause appearing therefore, and havinq heretofore made and
entered its Findinqs of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore

existing between the parties are dissolved, and a Decree of
Divorce is granted to the plaintiff, to become final upon the date
of entry hereof.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and

control of the minor child of the parties, subject to defendant's
riqhts of visitation which shall include reqular visits of once
during the week, which shall qenerally be Wednesday after school
until bedtime, and weekends at least two times per month from
Friday after school until Sunday evening.

That in the event that

either parent moves more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, the
visitation right shall^be rearranged to provide equivalent
visiting time.

That additionally, the holidays with the minor

child shall be alternated between the parties from year to year,
and the minor child shall spend at least two weeks of the summer
vacation with the defendant.

That visitation on principal

holidays, birthdays, and vacation shall be arranged between the
parties and alternated with the other party in the following year.
3.

That the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff

child support in the sum of $100.00 in March, 1986, $200.00 in

-2-

April, 1986, $300.00 in May, 1986, and $400.00 in June, 1986, and
$400.00 each month thereafter.

That in addition, the defendant is

ordered to provide standard health insurance for the benefit of
Christian.

That the defendant is ordered to acquire and pay for a

life insurance policy upon his own life for the bena.fit of
Christian Broadbent, in the amount of $75,000.00 beginning in
July, 1986.

That the defendants child support obligation shall

continue until Christian reaches the age of 18 years or has
graduated from hiqh school, whichever comes last.
4.

That the defendant is ordered to pay two-thirds (2/3)

of the dental and medical care provided to Christian, which is not
covered by the health insurance.

That such services shall be

aqreed upon prior to treatment, except in the case of emergency.
5.

That the defendant is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of

the costs for lessons and for summer school.
6.

That the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff

the sum of $300.00 per month, beginning July 30, 1986. That the
defendant's obligation for this payment shall continue for a
period of three years, or until the plaintiff remarries or
cohabits with an unrelated member of the opposite sex as defined
by Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
7.

That each of the parties is awarded the personal

property now in his or her possession, and to include household
furniture and other furnishings according to the addendum attached
to the parties' Stipulation, with the plaintiff to retain the
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porcelain horses and the woman with child, and the defendant the
Chinese Quon Yin figure.

That the plaintiff is ordered to deliver

said items to the defendant, upon approval of the Decree of
Divorce.
8.

That the defendant is ordered to transfer 322,000

shares from the family trust, so that after the divorce, the
plaintiff will own a total of 360,000 shares of International
Connections.
9.

That in the event any stock in International

Connections currently pledqed to Arthur Hackin diverts to the
defendant, it shall be divided equally between the parties.

That

in the event plaintiff receives any payments based upon an
increase on the value of American Methyl stock vrf-tieh, such
payments shall be the sole property of plaintiff.
10.

That both plaintiff and defendant shall each retain

such other investments, stocks and business interests as they may
own or acauire.
11.

That each party is ordered to assume and pay his or

her own separate debts and hold the other party harmless
therefrom.
12.

That each party is ordered to assume and pay his or

her own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
13.

That the plaintiff is awarded the use of her maiden

name, Helen Schumann.

DATED this

O

day of

A W ^

-4-

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

District Judge

CL

Approved as to form:
H . 0 * * O ^ j-:«ivov':Y

Ellen Maycock
*
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128)
Attorney for Plaintiff
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOoooHELEN S. BROADBENT,

:

cr- \ Q - %<! - &.\C\
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs,

Civil No. D81-173

ROSS BROADBENT,
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant.
oooOooo
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, Commissioner of the
above-entitled Court, on Tuesday, the 3rd day of March, 1987, at
the hour of 2:00 p.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through
her attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant appearing in
person and through his attorney Ellen Maycock of the firm of
Kruse, Landa & Maycock, and the Court having heard the arguments
and proffers of proof of counsel, having considered the contents
of the Court's file, having made its recommendation in open Court,
neither party having objected thereto within ten days, and good
cause appearing therefore;
NOW, THEREFORE;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
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T.

That the plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment

against the defendant in the sum of $5,300.00r representing child
support and alimony arrearages through February 28, 1987.
2.

That the plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment

against the defendant in the sum of $1,503.00, representing
medical and dental bilJLs incurred for the minor child of the
parties, which have been paid by the plaintiff due to the
defendant's failure to obtain health insurance as ordered in the
Decree of Divorce.
3.

That the- plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment

against the defendant in a sum of $393.50, representing one-half
of the costs of lessons and summer school for the benefit of the
minor child of the parties.
4.

That the defendant be and is hereby ordered to use his

best efforts to obtain appropriate employment so that he can
comply with the financial requirements j/f the Decree of Divorce
DATED this

/^

day of

^77>2^JV

< 1987,

Approved as to form:
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410 East Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone (801) 292-0560
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN S. BROADBENT,

;

Plaintiff,

i
]

vs.

]

ROSS BROADBENT,
Defendant,

ORDER

]i

Civil No. D81-173

]i

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Before the Court is the Defendant's Objection to Writs of Garnishment
issued by the Clerk on October 29, 1992, based upon the Court's Judgment dated May
12, 1987. Such Writs were issued in the amount of $13,316.82, representing principal
and interest in the statutory amount on the aforementioned Judgment.

Defendant

objected to such Writs and requested a hearing challenging the same. On November
23, 1992, the parties appeared before the Court, Plaintiff represented by James L.
Thompson, and Defendant represented by M. Joy Douglas, and argued their respective
positions in relation to the objections to the garnishments filed by Defendant.
Following argument, the Court requested legal Memoranda from counsel relating to the

issues raised during the course of oral argument. The matter was to be brought to the
Court's attention, and was therefore diaried on December 17, 1992. The Court, having
heard the arguments of counsel and having considered the Memoranda submitted by the
same, makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Orders as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 7, 1986, this Court granted a Decree of Divorce to the

parties, awarding custody of the minor child of the marriage, Christian Broadbent, to
Helen Broadbent (Schumann), the Plaintiff herein.
2.

In the Decree of Divorce this Court ordered Defendant to pay

Plaintiff, among other things, Child Support and Alimony, and other amounts for the
care and maintenance of their son.
3.

Defendant failed and refused to pay such sums as ordered by this

Court, and on May 12, 1987, the "Court entered its Judgment against Defendant and in
favor of Plaintiff in the principal amount of $7,196.50.
4.

The parties entered into a "Child Support and Alimony Settlement

Agreement," dated March 16, 1988, the consideration for which was identified: "In
exchange for a full release from all past, present or future obligations relating to child
support or alimony, Ross Broadbent hereby agrees [to] provide Helen Schumann with
vending machines under the following terms."
2

5.

The Settlement Agreement did not result in a Court Order and the

Court has not authorized the substitution of vending machines for child support, even
if the parties otherwise legitimately agree, and Plaintiff received no benefit under the
Settlement Agreement.
6.

Plaintiffs calculations set out in the Writs of Garnishment of the

amounts due under the Judgment dated May 12, 1987, are accurate and appropriate,
which amount is $13,316.82 in principal and interest due and owing as of October 12,
1992.

Plaintiff has necessarily incurred costs and attorney fees in the amount of

$2,201.20 (through and including the filing of Plaintiffs Reply Brief) resulting from this
proceeding to collect the amounts due under the Court's Judgment. Further interest on
the Judgment amount from October 12, 1992 through December 12, 1992, amounts to
$253.65, plus an additional $5.19 each day thereafter until paid.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To the extent that the Defendant asserts that the stipulation entered

into between the parties in the Settlement Agreement prohibits the issuance of the
Writs of Garnishment

based upon Judgments earlier obtained, the Settlement

Agreement is invalid and without any legitimate consideration.
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2.

The Writs of Garnishment are based upon a duly entered Judgment,

which is enforceable through post-judgment collection proceedings, such as a Writ of
Garnishment.
3.

Defendant's claims that the amounts sought through the Writs of

Garnishment are excessive is unsupported.

There is no admissible evidence in the

materials submitted by Defendant suggesting that Plaintiffs calculations as set forth in
the Writs of Garnishment are inappropriate. Such calculations are, therefore, accurate.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing and good reason appearing therefore it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Court overrules the Defendant's Objections to the Writs of

Garnishment finding them to be without merit.
2.

Plaintiff may proceed to obtain the funds being held by the parties

garnished, to satisfy the outstanding Judgments heretofore awarded in favor of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
3.

Plaintiff may augment the amounts of such outstanding Judgments

by her costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee, making the total amount
of the Judgment of May 12, 1992, $15,865.09, including interest through December 31,
1992, plus an additional $5.19 each day thereafter until paid.
4

4.

Counsel for Plaintiff

is to prepare an appropriate Order in

conformity with the Court's Minute Entry Decision, and submit the same to the Court
for review and signature pursuant .to the Code of Judicial Administration.
DATED this

/T

day of January, 1993.
BY THE CdURT:

)istrict Court Judge

flZfrtf
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon Defendant by
mailing a true copy of the same, first class United States mail, to the following on this
31st day of December, 1992:
M. Joy Douglas, ESq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

p^XSr-James L. ^Thompson
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HELEfS S. BROADBENT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. D-81-173

vs.
ROSS BROADBENT,
Defendant.

The above-referenced matter is before the Court for decision
relating generally to amounts claimed by the plaintiff as unpaid
and presently due under the terms of an original divorce Decree
entered by this Court on May 7, 1986.

Since the entry of the

original Decree, this Court on May 12, 1987 signed a Judgment
awarding plaintiff certain sums as arrearages and made certain
orders

requiring

the

defendant

requirements of the Decree,

to

comply

with

the

financial

To the extent there is a dispute

between the parties as to whether or not there have been payments
on the May 12, 1987 Judgment, the Court finds that there has been
none and

the amount due

under

the May

12, 1987 Judgment is,

including interest at the rate of 12% per annum through March 10,
1993, $13,965.84-

All remaining claims allegedly accrued since the

May 12, 1987 Judgment.
The Court in relation to that Judgment has awarded attorney's
fees in an amount of $2,201.20 as was contained in the Order of

oo^501

BROADBENT V. BROADBENT

January

14, 1993.

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

To the extent that there

is any question

regarding the status of the May 12, 1987 Judgment and any credits
claimed due against that Judgment, the Court finds that there are
none and finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
on those issues.
It also appears to the Court that there continues to be a
continuing objection to the Writs of Execution, suggesting that the
Writs of Execution are improper, inasmuch as there is an alleged
agreement,

at

least

asserted

by

the

defendant,

to

resolve

outstanding arrearages and that the amounts claimed under the Writs
of Execution are excessive.
As to the question of whether or not the Writs were proper,
the Court determines to the extent that it has not already done so,
that the Writs of Execution are proper.

This Court declined to

accept, enforce or otherwise consider the so-called
agreement

between

the

plaintiff

heretofore ruled on those

and

the

settlement

defendant,

and

has

issues, and the Court has not been

advised of any legitimate reason why its ruling should be modified.
As

to

the

amounts

that

are

defendant from and since the May

due

the

plaintiff

from

the

12, 1987 Judgment, excluding

interest on the May 12, 1987 Judgment and the previously awarded
amount of attorney's fees, this Court determines as follows.

I- 0 o i- -

BROADBENT V. BROADBENT

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Alimony is owed the plaintiff from the defendant in the principal
amount of $8,03 5.00.

Added to that is interest on the amount of

alimony from the date that it was due on a periodic basis, and at
the statutory
plaintiff,
relating

interest rate.

and
to

finds

unpaid

the

The Court finds in favor of the

plaintiff's

alimony

testimony

persuasive,

and

and

the

evidence

defendant's

testimony unpersuasive.
On the amount of child support that is due and payable, the
Court finds that child support due the plaintiff by the defendant
as of November 1992 is $25,065.00.

Added to that is interest at

the statutory rate from the due date of each interest payment.

On

the issue of unpaid child support, the Court finds the plaintiff's
testimony and. evidence persuasive on the amounts due, and the
defendant's evidentiary^offerings unpersuasive.
The plaintiff seeks unpaid expenses that were ordered to be
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff as a result of the Decree of
Divorce, and incidental expenses that she has incurred as a result
of her checking and savings accounts being garnished by defendant's
creditors for sums that the defendant was to pay as a result of the
Decree.
On the issue of unpaid expenses, the Court finds that there is
presently due and owing $8,697.51 as asserted by the plaintiff.
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The plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in those amounts for unpaid
expenses and consequential expenses as a result of the defendant's
failure to comply with the Court's original Decree of Divorce.

The

plaintiff's evidence is persuasive on those issues, whereas the
Court finds the defendant's evidence lacking and unpersuasive.
Plaintiff is entitled to statutory interest on the amounts due for
unpaid expenses as of the date that the expense was incurred.
The Decree of Divorce specifically provided that the defendant
will provide standard health care insurance for the benefit of the
minor child, Christian.

The plaintiff asserts that the defendant

has not provided the standard health care insurance, and that she
was required to do so to insure that the child, Christian, who
suffers from_some substantial physical problems, did not become
uninsurable.

There is evidence that the defendant from time to

time may have provided some insurance but that evidence fails in
its evidentiary value due to the vague nature of the testimony
offered by the defendant regarding the times that insurance was
available and the manner in which it was provided, if at all.
The evidence supports and the Court finds that the plaintiff,
to

insure the continued

insurability

of the minor child, has

provided at her own expense insurance coverage and that the amount
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of funds that she has paid to insure the health insurance remained
in effect is the principal sum of $6,900.00.

The Court finds that

she is entitled to that amount from the defendant in that she has
paid

the

defendant's

obligation

insurance coverage is continuing.

to

insure

that

the

child's

The plaintiff is entitled to

interest at the statutory rate from and after the dates that the
health insurance premiums were paid by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further asserts that the defendant has failed to
comply with that portion of the Decree that required him to acquire
and pay for a life insurance policy on his own life for the benefit
of the minor child

in an amount of not less than $75,000.00,

commencing in July of 1986.

Certain policies have been in effect

on the life jDf the defendant in accordance with the Decree of
Divorce, but those poricies have been paid for, purchased
maintained by the plaintiff.

and

Defendant's claims that there were

other policies naming a trust as beneficiary are unpersuasive.

No

trust has been offered in evidence, and even if the trust provides
as the defendant suggests, there is no guarantee that the funds
would be available to the minor child as required by the original
Decree of Divorce.
The evidence shows and the Court finds that the plaintiff has
paid a total of $9,246.00 through November of 1992 for life
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The Court finds the

plaintiff's evidence perstiasive on this issue, and the defendant's
evidence unpersuasive.

In addition to the principal amount of

$9,246.00 through November

1992, the plaintiff

is entitled

to

interest at the statutory rate from the date that the expense was
incurred.
Further on that subject, the defendant is advised that the
Court expects that he will no later than forty-five (45) days from
the

date

of

this

Memorandum

Decision

obtain

and

pay

for

appropriate life insurance, and supply to the plaintiff and her
attorney

proof

of

said

insurance, all as to comply

original Decree of Divorce.

with

the

Failure to do so without adequate

explanation will require this Court to consider issues of contempt
and the potential

sanctions

therefor, including

incarceration,

should there be evidence that the defendant continues to ignore the
Court orders regarding his responsibility towards the plaintiff and
the minor child.
The plaintiff also seeks attorney's fees.

The Court has

determined that the amount of attorney's fees of $2,201.20 is
appropriate for the collection of the May 12, 1987 Judgment.

Those

attorney's fees may be reduced to a Judgment and interest will
accrue in accordance with the statutory rate thereon.
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The plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs in
an additional amount of

$4,145.00

for additional

fees and

costs

related to the defendant's objections to the amounts contained in
the Writs of Garnishment and demands for evidentiary hearings to
recalculate and offer evidence relating to the amount claimed by
the plaintiff.
The Court is satisfied that the original attorney's fees and
costs

sought

by

the

plaintiff

are

appropriate,

and

awards

additional attorney's fees and costs in accordance with Exhibit
(the

Affidavit

plaintiff's

of

closing

plaintiff's
statement

counsel),
brief.

as
The

attached

to

plaintiff

,f

CH

the
has

substantially prevailed on all issues, the defendant's response has
been unpersuasdve, and appears to be calculated merely to frustrate
the attempted collectiort of any amounts that have long been due and
owing to the plaintiff from the defendant.
The defendant has done little, if anything, to comply with the
Court's orders

in the original

Decree of Divorce,

He has

made

insignificant contributions to the financial needs or other welfare
of the child, and has basically left the total responsibility for
those obligations to the plaintiff.

The defendant's efforts to

further frustrate the plaintiff's attempted collection of at least
some of the amounts that she is rightfully entitled appear to the

r f\ r p, n
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Court to border upon bad faith, and while the Court does not make
such a specific finding, it does award attorney's fees on the basis
that the expenses and fees have

been incurred as a result of the

demands of the defendant, and that the defendant has failed to
prevail.

The plaintiff is not in a position to pay the attorney's

fees that she has incurred as a result of the defendant's challenge
to Garnishments and other matters, as contained herein, and further
considering the conduct of the defendant throughout these long
proceedings since the divorce Decree was originally entered, and
his lack of any meaningful cooperation, the additional attorney's
fees are not only warranted, but in this Court's view mandated.
The

Court

is holding
the

sum

of

a

check

issued

$15,052.67

made

as

a

result

payable

to

of

a

Garnishment

in

Helen

Broadbent.

That check Vill be made available to the plaintiff's

counsel upon the signing of an appropriate Order in conformity with
this

Memorandum

Decision.

The

proceeds

realized

from

the

aforementioned check shall be noted in the Court's file with an
appropriate pleading representing a partial satisfaction of the
outstanding Judgments.

The aforementioned funds are to be applied

to the oldest obligations first.
Counsel

for

the

plaintiff

is

requested

to

prepare

an

appropriate set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders
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relating to the issues discussed in this Memorandum Decision, and
submit the same to the Court for review/and signature pursuant to
the Code of Judicial Administration,
Dated this <~Xb day of April/ 1993

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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FILED OSSTKtST COURT
Third Judicial District

James L. Thompson (#5807)
Attorney for Plaintiff
410 East Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone (801) 292-0560
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SALT L / K £ COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN S. BROADBENT,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

ROSS BROADBENT,
Defendant,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER OF THE COURT

)

Civil No. D81-173

)

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Before the Court is the Defendant's Objection to Writs of Garnishment obtained
by the Plaintiff pursuant to amounts claimed by the Plaintiff as unpaid and presently
due under the terms of an original divorce Decree entered by this Court on May 7,
1986.

Defendant objected to such Writs and requested a hearing challenging the

validity of the same and the amounts claimed due thereunder.

On February 8 and

March 8,1993, the parties appeared at an evidentiary hearing before the Court, Plaintiff
represented by James L. Thompson, and Defendant represented by M. Joy Jelte, and
argued their respective positions in relation to the objections to the garnishments filed
by Defendant.

Following such hearing and argument, the Court requested final
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arguments in writing from counsel relating to the issues raised during the course of the
hearing. The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, examined the evidence
presented by 'he parties, and heard ^arguments of counsel and having considered the
final arguments submitted by the same, makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and Orders as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 7, 1986, this Court granted a Decree of Divorce to the parties,

awarding custody of the minor child of the marriage, Christian Broadbent, to Helen
(Broadbcnt) Schumann, the Plaintiff herein.
2.

In the Decree of Divorce this Court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff,

among other things, Child Support and Alimony, and other amounts for the care and
maintenance of their son; namely, that Defendant maintain health insurance on the
child and maintain a policy of life insurance on himself for the benefit of the child, and
that Defendant pay portions of medical and other expenses incurred for the benefit of
the child.
3.

Defendant failed and refused to pay such sums as ordered by this Court,

and on May 12, 1987, the Court entered its Judgment against Defendant and in favor
of Plaintiff in the principal amount of $7,196.50, and further ordered the Defendant to
comply with the financial requirements of the Decree.
2
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4.

There has been no payment made by Defendant to Plaintiff toward the

Judgment of May 12, 1987, and no credit is due, and the amount due and owing under
such Judgment as of March 10, 1993, including interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum, is $13,965.84. Plaintiff is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees in the amount
of $2,201.20 for costs of collection of such amount as was granted in the Court's Order
of January 14, 1993, and such amounts are specifically found to be reasonable and
appropriate. The Court specifically finds in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on
all issues relating to the May 12, 1987 Judgment, including the award of attorney's fees,
plus interest thereon at the statutory rate.
5.

Any claims of satisfaction or payment of any amount due herein pursuant

lo an alleged Settlement Agreement between the parties are invalid as has been
previously ruled by this Court, and all writs issued herein have been obtained properly,
and not in excessive amounts.
6.

All remaining claims accrued since the entry of the May 12, 1987

Judgement in the following amounts, and the Court finds as follows.
7.

Alimony is owed Plaintiff from Defendant in the principal amount of

$8,035.00, plus interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date such alimony became
due. The Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff, and find's Plaintiffs testimony and
evidence relating to unpaid alimony persuasive, and the Defendant's testimony
unpersuasive.
3
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8.

Child Support is owed Plaintiff from Defendant in the principal amount

of $25,065.00 through November 1992, plus interest thereon at 12% per annum from the
date such Child Support became due. The Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff, and
find's Plaintiffs testimony and evidence relating to unpaid Child Support persuasive,
and the Defendant's testimony and evidentiary offerings unpersuasive.
9.

Unpaid Expenses are owed Plaintiff from Defendant in the principal

amount of $8,697.51 through November 1992, including incidental expenses that Plaintiff
incurred as a result of her checking and savings accounts being garnished by Defendant's creditors for sums that Defendant was to pay as a result of the Decree, plus
interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date such Unpaid Expense became due.
The Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff, and find's Plaintiffs testimony and evidence
relating to Unpaid Expenses persuasive, and the Defendant's testimony and evidentiary
offerings unpersuasive.

Such Unpaid Expenses result from Defendant's failure to

comply with the Court's original* Decree of Divorce.
10.

The Plaintiff, to ensure the continued medical insurability of Christian, the

minor child, has provided at her own expense medical insurance coverage in the amount
of $6,900.00, and is entitled to such amount from Defendant in that she had paid the
Defendant's obligation to insure that the child's insurance coverage is continuing, plus
interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date each such premium payment became
due.
4
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11.

Defendant was ordered in the Decree of Divorce to obtain and pay for a

policy of Life Insurance of not less than $75,000.00 on his own life for the benefit of
Christian Broadbent, and Plaintiff has purchased and maintained such policies of Life
Insurance on the life of Defendant.

Defendant has failed to prove that he provided

such policies of Life Insurance and Plaintiff is owed from Defendant $9246.00 through
November 1992, plus interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date each such Life
Insurance premium became due. The Court finds in favoi of the Plaintiff, and find's
Plaintiffs testimony and evidence relating to Life Insurance persuasive, and the
Defendant's testimony and evidentiary offerings unpersuasive.
12.

Plaintiff has substantially prevailed on all issues herein and is entitled to

her additional reasonable costs and attorney's fees in connection with these further
proceedings in the amount of $4,145.00, plus interest thereon at the statutory rate from
the date of entry hereof.
13.

The Court finds "that Defendant's

response to Plaintiffs

Writs of

Garnishment has been unpersuasive and appears to be calculated merely to frustrate
Plaintiffs attempts to collect the amounts that have been long due and owing her from
the Defendant. Defendant's efforts to further frustrate Plaintiffs attempted collection
of at least some of the amounts to which she is rightfully entitled appear to the Court
to border upon bad faith.
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14.

The Court finds that Defendant has done little, if anything, to comply with

the Court's orders in the original Decree of Divorce.
15.

The Court finds that Defendant has made insignificant contributions to the

financial needs or other welfare of the minor child, Christian Broadbent, and has
essentially left the total responsibility for those obligations to Plaintiff.
16.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs

incurred as a result of Defendant's

costs and attorney's fees have been

challenges and demands made herein, that

Defendant has failed to prevail, and that Plaintiff is not in a position to pay for her
costs and attorney's fees. The Court further finds that considering the conduct of the
Defendant throughout these long proceedings and since the Divorce Decree vsas
originally entered, and Defendant's lack of meaningful cooperation, the additional
attorney's fees are not only warranted, but in the Court's view, are mandated.
17.

The Court is holding a check issued as a result of a Garnishment in the

sum of $15,052.67 made payable to Helen Broadbent, to which Plaintiff is entitled upon
the signing of this Order, the amount of the proceeds of which will be noted in the
Court's files with an appropriate pleading representing a partial satisfaction of the
outstanding Judgments.
18.

Neither Plaintiff nor her attorney acted inappropriately in intercepting

such check from Freedom Mortgage Corp. and forwarding the same to the Court, and
Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause is without merit.
6
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
19.

The Writs of Garnishment are based upon duly entered Judgments, which

arc enforceable through post-judgment collection proceedings, such as a Writ of
Garnishment.
20.

Defendant's claims that the amounts sought through the Writs of

Garnishment are excessive are unsupported.

There is no evidence suggesting that

Plaintiffs calculations as set forth in the Writs of Garnishment are inappropriate.
21.

Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause is without merit, and should

be dismissed.
22.

Plaintiff is entitled to the following principal amounts calculated through

November 1992, and interest amounts thereon calculated through March 10, 1993:
Judgment of May 12, 1987
Unpaid Alimony
Unpaid Child Support
Unpaid Expenses
Health Insurance Reimbursement
Life Insurance Reimbursement
Interest on Unpaid Amounts
Attorney's Fees and Costs

7

$7,196.50
6J69.34
13,965.84
$8,035.00
25,065.00
8,697.51
6,900.00
9,246.00
29,261.89
6,342.81
93,548.21

principal
interest
Subtotal

$107,514.05

TOTAL

Subtotal

r. p. - r\ 7.

Plaintiff is further entitled to interest on the total amount of $107,514.05 at the statutory
rate, $35.34 per diem from March 10, 1993, until paid. All funds collected pursuant to
such amounts shall be applied to the oldest obligations first.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing and good reason appearing therefore it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
23.

The Court overrules the Defendant's

Objections

to the Writs of

Garnishment finding them to be without merit.
24.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the following principal amounts calculated through November 1992, and interest
amounts thereon calculated through March 10, 1993:
Judgment of May 12, 1987
Unpaid Alimony
Unpaid Child Support
Unpaid Expenses
Health Insurance Reimbursement
Life Insurance Reimbursement
Interest on Unpaid Amounts
Attorney's Fees and Costs

8

$7,196.50
6.769.34
13,965.84
$8,035.00
25,065.00
8,697.51
6,900.00
9,246.00
29,261.89
6,342.81
93,548.21

principal
interest
Subtotal

$107,514.05

TOTAL

Subtotal
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25.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for

interest on the total amount of $107,514.05 at the statutory rate, $35.34 per diem from
March 10, 1993, until paid.
26.

All funds collected pursuant to such amounts shall be applied to the oldest

obligations first.
27.

Plaintiff may proceed to obtain the funds being held by the parties

garnished, to satisfy the outstanding Judgments heretofore awarded in favor of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
28.

Plaintiff may augment the amounts of such outstanding Judgments by her

costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
29.

Defendant shall obtain and pay for appropriate Life Insurance as ordered

in the Decree of Divorce within 45 days of the date of the Memorandum Decision
(April 28, 1993), and supply to Plaintiff and her attorney proof of said insurance. If
Defendant fails to do so without adequate explanation, the Court shall consider issues
of contempt and the potential sanctions therefore, including incarceration.
30.

Such issues of contempt and sanctions, including incarceration, shall be

considered should there be any evidence that Defendant continues to ignore the Court's
Orders regarding his responsibility towards the Plaintiff and the minor child.
31.

Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

and an appropriate Order in conformity with the Court's Memorandum Decision, and
submit the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration.
32.

Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause is denied.
9
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DATED this

^ f

day of May,
BY THE g^URT:

Hstrict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon Defendant by
mailing a true copy of the same, first class United States mail, to the following on
30th day of April, 1993: ^ S o 5^07 A <Z&P*T GF- V*%:
jyopc^t
M. Joy Jclle, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 Snuth Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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